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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
HEATHER POOLE,
plaintiff,
v.
TUMBLR, INC.,
defendant.

:
:
:
: Civil no. 3:18cv00859(AVC)
:
:
:

RULING ON THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
This is an action for damage s in which the plaintiff,
Heather Poole, alleges that the defendant, Tumblr, Inc.,
unlawfully displayed photographs of Poole and failed to remove
them from their website.

Poole brings her claims pursuant to

common law tenets concerning invasion of privacy and negligent
infliction of emotional distress.1

Tumblr has filed the within

motion to dismiss arguing that the complaint fails to state a
claim.

The issue to be determined is whether Tumblr is entitled

to immunity under section 230(c)(1) of the Communications
Decency Act (hereinafter “CDA”).

For the reasons that follow,

the motion is granted.
FACTS
The complaint states the following facts.
Poole is a resident of Bristol, Connecticut.

1

The June 14, 2018 amended complaint also seeks relief pursuant to copyright
law and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § § 512, 1201-1205.
However, on September 9, 2018, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion to
withdraw those claims.
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Tumblr, Inc. “operates the internet website URL
www.tumblr.com which is available in the United States and
throughout the world.

Tumblr allows its subscribers to post

images, music and videos on Tumblr servers. Tumblr copies and
stores such materials, and displays and distributes them to the
public.”
In May 2017, Poole “began dating Tomak Paluch of Bristol
CT. The parties were involved in an intimate relationship.”

The

complaint alleges that on August 12, 2017 and on other dates,
“the parties exchanged intimate naked photographs of each
other.”
On “September 5, 2017, the parties separated, and the
plaintiff deleted any photographs she had of Mr. Paluch and
blocked his telephone number, Facebook and all other means of
communications.”
“On September 13, 2017[,] Mr. Paluch posted on Facebook a
public status about [Poole] which was taken down after a
complaint made to Facebook. Thereafter Mr. Paluch continued to
harass [Poole].”
“On January 5, 2018[,] Mr. Paluch posted five (5) nude
photos of [Poole] to myex.com. . . . These photos were also
posted on Facebook and after the plaintiff made a complaint to
the local police department, the photos were removed.”

2
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“On January 6, 2018[,] although myex.com removed the photos
they were then uploaded to Tumblr using the plaintiff’s name,
links to Facebook and Linkedin, and added other personal
information. Other users re-blogged her photos to other sites
with links to her social media accounts. Various messages were
sent to the plaintiff either threatening her or alerting her to
the nude photos on Tumblr.”
From January 7, 2018 to January 15, 2018, twenty three
“posts reported to Tumblr using their ‘report’ link.”
“Notwithstanding the fact that users often report the
plaintiff’s photos daily after Tumblr removes them, Tumblr
continues to post the same. On numerous and diverse dates, the
plaintiff has requested that Tumblr take down her unauthorized
intimate photographs but such photographs, even though [sic] the
date of [the]complaint, continue to appear on Tumblr.”
The complaint states that “[t]he foregoing acts of
contributory infringement by Tumblr have been willful,
intentional and purposeful, in disregard of and with
indifference to the rights of plaintiff.”
STANDARD
A court must grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if a plaintiff fails to
establish a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Such a

motion “asses(es) the legal feasibility of the complaint, [it
3
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does] not . . . assay the weight of the evidence which might be
offered in support thereof.”

Ryder Energy Distribution Corp. v.

Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir.
1984).

When ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, the court must “accept

the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.”

Broder v.

Cablevision Sys. Corp., 418 F.3d 187, 196 (2d Cir. 2005).

In

order to survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must allege
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.”
(2007).

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

The complaint must allege more than “[t]hreadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements.”
(2009).

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

The court may consider only those “facts stated on the

face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or
incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of
which judicial notice may be taken.”

Allen v. WestPoint-

Pepperell, Inc., 945 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1991).
DISCUSSION
Tumblr argues that it is entitled to immunity from
liability with respect to Poole’s invasion of privacy claim.
Specifically, Tumblr argues that section 230 of the CDA, 47
U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(1), 230(e)(3), provides Tumblr with such
immunity.

According to Tumblr, “Poole has brought this
4
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copyright and invasion of privacy action against the wrong
defendant. Accepting all of the allegations in her Complaint as
true, Plaintiff may have a legitimate grievance against an exboyfriend and third parties who published . . . photographs of
her . . . . But whatever those claims may be, Plaintiff does
not, and cannot, allege any viable claims against Tumblr.”
Poole argues in opposition that “Tumblr misunderstands the
gravamen of [her] complaint; the complaint is not that Tumblr
published her nude photographs which were sent from a third
party: her complaint is that Tumblr continued to do so after
receiving notice from [Poole] at least 7 times to take down her
photographs.”

According to Poole, Congress enacted the

Communications Decency Act in order “to protect Internet Service
Providers (ISP) from litigation when they act as a ‘Good
Samaritan’ blocking or editing offensive postings.”

Tumblr’s

alleged conduct in this case does not, according to Poole, fall
within that purpose.

Poole also notes that section 230’s

immunity “is not absolute” and requires a showing of good faith.
Poole states that in this case there is an issue as to “whether
or not the good faith issue was involved by the ISP’s conduct in
ignoring the electronic fingerprint of [Poole’s] photographs.”
Tumblr replies that Poole’s attempt to read a good faith
requirement into section 230 is not legally supported and not
factually pled.

Specifically, Tumblr argues that “[f]ederal
5

Case 3:18-cv-00859-AVC Document 30 Filed 03/07/19 Page 6 of 12

courts have specifically and consistently rejected the argument
that § 230(c)(1)’s immunity is conditioned on good faith or
preemptive blocking of offensive conduct.”

Tumblr notes that

the purpose of the Common Decency Act is to provide broad
immunity to any claim that would make providers liable for
third-party user information and prevents claims that put a
provider, like Tumblr, in a “publisher’s role.”

Tumblr states

that section 230(c)(1) does not require that it “preemptively
block publication” of Poole’s photographs and notes that
Congress recognized “speech interests” when enacting these broad
provisions for service provider immunity.

According to Tumblr,

none of the cases that Poole cites provide authority to the
contrary.

Even if there is a good faith requirement in section

230(c)(1), Tumblr notes that Poole has failed to plead facts
that Tumblr had the technology to identify Poole’s “electronic
fingerprint” but “chose not to deploy it.”

Finally, Tumblr

reiterates that it meets the 230(c)(1) requirements for immunity
because it is undisputed that it is a provider of an interactive
computer service, the information at issue was provided by a
third party user and the claim at issue seeks to treat Tumblr as
a publisher.

Therefore, Tumblr states that its immunity is

“evident from the face of the complaint.”
Section 230 provides that “[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher
6
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or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). “Preemption is
express: ‘No cause of action may be brought and no liability may
be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent
with this section.’” Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, 781
F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir 2015) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3)).

“The

statute defines ‘interactive computer service’ expansively, to
include ‘any information service, system, or access software
provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple
users to a computer server.’”

Id. at 27-28 (quoting §

230(f)(2)). The second circuit has recognized that “this wording
has been construed broadly to effectuate the statute's speechprotective purpose . . . .”

Id. at 28.

Specifically, the court

recognized that
Congress recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits
pose to freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning
Internet medium.... Section 230 was enacted, in part, to
maintain the robust nature of Internet communication and,
accordingly, to keep government interference in the medium
to a minimum.... None of this means, of course, that the
original culpable party who posts defamatory messages would
escape accountability.... Congress made a policy choice,
however, not to deter harmful online speech through the
separate route of imposing tort liability on companies that
serve as intermediaries for other parties' potentially
injurious messages.
Id. (quoting Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31
(4th Cir. 1997)). As a result, “a plaintiff defamed on the
internet can sue the original speaker, but typically ‘cannot sue

7
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the messenger.’”

Id. (quoting Chi. Lawyers' Comm. for Civil

Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 672
(7th Cir. 2008)).
“In applying the statute, courts have ‘broken [it] down
into three component parts,’ finding that ‘[i]t shields conduct
if the defendant (1) ‘is a provider or user of an interactive
computer service, (2) the claim is based on information provided
by another information content provider and (3) the claim would
treat [the defendant] as the publisher or speaker of that
information.’’” Federal Trade Commission v. LeadClick Media,
LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 173 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Jane Doe No. 1 v.
Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting
Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418
(1st Cir. 2007))).

“Although “[p]reemption under the

Communications Decency Act is an affirmative defense, ... it can
still support a motion to dismiss if the statute's barrier to
suit is evident from the face of the complaint.”

Ricci v.

Teamsters Union Local 456, 781 F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir 2015)
(quoting Klayman v. Zukerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (citing McKenna v. Wright,386 F.3d 432, 436 (2d
Cir.2004))).
There is no dispute that Tumblr has satisfied the three
statutory requirements for immunity pursuant to section
230(c)(1).

Specifically, Tumblr “is a provider or user of an
8
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interactive computer service,” the claim here involves
information provided by a third party and Poole’s claims for
invasion of privacy and infliction of emotional distress “treat
[Tumblr] as the publisher or speaker of that information.”
Federal Trade Commission v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158,
173 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Therefore, the only issue to be determined is whether
section 230 contains a good faith requirement and, as a result,
an issue of fact exists with respect to Tumblr’s alleged
conduct.
In Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 2011WL5079526 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26,
2011), aff'd, 765 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2014), the court addressed
the issue of whether section 230(c)(1) contains a good faith or
intent requirement.

Id. at *7.

The court held that the fact

“[t]hat § 230(c)(2)2 expressly provides for a good faith element”
and such requirement is “omitted from § 230(c)(1) indicates that
Congress intended not to import a subjective intent/good faith
limitation into § 230(c)(1).”

Id. at *7.

2

The Levitt court

Section 230(c)(2) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held
liable on account of—
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content
providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material
described in paragraph (1).
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (emphasis added).

9

Case 3:18-cv-00859-AVC Document 30 Filed 03/07/19 Page 10 of 12

recognized that “‘[w]here Congress includes particular language
in one section of a statute but omits it in another ..., it is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’”

Id.

(quoting Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208
(1993)).

Therefore, the court concluded that “the text of the

two subsections of § 230(c) indicates that (c)(1)'s immunity
applies regardless of whether the publisher acts in good faith.”
Levitt at *7.
In Zeran v. AOL, 129 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 1997), the
fourth circuit held that section 230(c)(1) provided immunity to
the defendant, AOL, where it took down third parties’ allegedly
defamatory statements, but it did not prevent the statements
from being republished.

The court recognized that “lawsuits

seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a
publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding
whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are
barred.”

Id. at 330; see Federal Trade Commission v. LeadClick

Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 174 (2d Cir. 2016).

Further, in

Universal Commc’n Sys, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st
Cir. 2007), the first circuit held that “[i]t is, by now, well
established that notice of the unlawful nature of the
information provided is not enough to make it the service
provider’s own speech.”

Id. at 420.
10

The court confirmed that
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other courts have recognized “that Section 230 immunity applies
even after notice of the potentially unlawful nature of the
third-party content.”

Id.

Poole has failed to provide authority for the proposition
that section 230(c)(1) includes a requirement of good faith. The
facts of this case amount to state law claims “seeking to hold a
service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s
traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to
publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content . . . .”

Zeran v.

AOL, 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997); see Federal Trade
Commission v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 174 (2d Cir.
2016). As the second circuit has recognized, by enacting section
230(c)(1) “Congress made a policy choice . . . not to deter
harmful online speech through the separate route of imposing
tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for
other parties' potentially injurious messages.”

Ricci v.

Teamsters Union Local 456, 781 F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir 2015)
(quoting Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th
Cir. 1997)). Although immunity pursuant to section 230(c)(1) is
an affirmative defense, in this case “the statute's barrier to
suit is evident from the face of the complaint.”

Ricci v.

Teamsters Union Local 456, 781 F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir 2015).3

3

As

As previously stated, Tumblr “is a provider or user of an interactive
computer service,” the claim here involves information provided by a third
party and Poole’s claims for invasion of privacy and infliction of emotional

11
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the facts of this case satisfy the requirements for immunity
under section 230(c)(1), Tumblr’s motion to dismiss is granted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Tumblr’s motion to dismiss
(document no. 12) is granted.
So ordered this 4th day of March, 2019, at Hartford,
Connecticut.
/s/
Alfred V. Covello
United States District Judge

distress “treat [Tumblr] as the publisher or speaker of that information.”
Federal Trade Commission v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 173 (2d Cir.
2016) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The allegations in
the complaint support this conclusion and the plaintiff has not provided
arguments to the contrary.
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